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The contribution of social sciences to risk assessment has often been confined to dimensions
of risk perception and communication. This article relates an effort to promote knowledge
from the social sciences that addresses other dimensions of risk issues. A sociological check-
list produced for ANSES in France helps to identify andanalyse social dimensions that should
be given attention during the process of risk assessment.
I. Introduction
The contribution of social sciences to risk analysis can
be traced to the 1970s. As different disciplines from the
natural sciences strived to establish a rigorousmethod
to define the existence, probability and amplitude of
risks related to nuclear energy or chemicals in the en-
vironment or the workplace, (psycho)sociologists un-
dertook in parallel to study differences in risk percep-
tions between experts and the lay public. They con-
cluded that risks weremental constructs, not objective
facts, whose definition rested on the use of different
frames of reference. The identification of the factors
shaping the public’s perception of risks led to the de-
velopment of the subfield of risk communication, de-
signed to reduce the gap between lay and expert per-
ceptions and help policymakers address the legitimate
concerns of the general public when managing risks.1
Thewealth of studies dedicated to risk perception,
amplification and communication since the 1970s is
a testimony to the importanceof this fieldof research.
Whilst initially considered outside the process of risk
assessment andmanagement as codified by the NRC
in its 1983 Red Book, risk perception and communi-
cation made their way in the process during the
1990s. Progressively, societal concerns were consid-
ered important enough to warrant the development
of various models. In the most recent, IRGC’s risk
governance framework (2008), social sciences are in-
tegrated in each of the four stages (pre-assessment,
risk appraisal, tolerability and acceptability judg-
ment, and risk management).2 The journal Risk
Analysis also testifies to the importance of social sci-
ence knowledge in governing risks.
Yet, for all their efforts to bring in societal con-
cerns in the process of risk analysis, thesemodels fail
to question the separation between science and soci-
ety. This can be traced back to the initial assumption
that the public’s perceptions differ from those of ex-
perts, although risk perception scholars insisted that
both were equally valid. With the multiplication of
health and environmental crises, scandals and con-
troversies during the 1990s in Europe, policymakers
acknowledged that societal concerns should be tak-
en into consideration along with scientific input in
managing risks – but separately. Accordingly, inde-
pendent agencies were set up on the basis of a clear
separation between risk assessment (domain of the
natural sciences) and riskmanagement (where social
sciences could be called upon). These agencies nev-
er considered the possibility that social sciences
might contribute to the characterization of dangers
or the definition of risks. In the minds of their pro-
moters, social sciences were only required once the
risk had been established, in order to help commu-
nicate the findings to the general public and come
up with acceptable decisions.
This separation has come under strong criticism
from sociologists, anthropologists and political sci-
entists, who have shown that the boundary between
science and society is a social construct, designed to
delineate a special area of expertise and competence
for scientists, leaving the rest to “politics”.3 But in a
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3 Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and
Engineers through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987). Sheila Jasanoff, “Contested Boundaries in Policy-
Relevant Science”, 17-2 Social Studies of Science (1987), pp. 195
et sqq.
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context of reiterated scandals and mounting social
contention, public authorities have also come to re-
alize that sole reliance on scientific expertise toman-
age risks, in particular when issues are uncertain,
complex and ambiguous,4 is politically hazardous.
Accordingly, initiatives have been taken to introduce
social sciences in the process of risk analysis. These
have taken different forms, from the recruitment of
social scientists and the creation of dedicated ser-
vices, to the participation of social scientists in ex-
pert committees, agency boards and the production
of expert advice. For the most part, these initiatives
have produced mixed results5 – in part because the
evidence they provide is notwell adapted to the dom-
inant forms of knowledge (and their epistemologies
and methods of validation) used in traditional risk
analysis.
This mismatch has spurred efforts to adapt social
science knowledge to the assessment of risk issues.
Among these have emerged sociological checklists or
guides that aim to introduce a more analytic ap-
proach, anchored in academic knowledge but orient-
ed towards pragmatic uses. In the Netherlands, the
National Institute for Public Health and the Environ-
ment (RIVM) supported in 2003 the elaboration of a
questionnaire destined to explicit various forms of
“uncertainty”. This checklist mentioned topics such
as problem framing, stakeholder involvement or un-
certaintiesbasedonknowledge.6 InFrance, theHaute
Autorité de Santé (HAS) supported in 2009 the con-
ception of a sociological checklist for its own staff
when assessing health technologies.7 In 2011, the
French Institut de Veille Sanitaire (InVS) published
a guide to help its agents assess the social context
when investigating a local environmental health risk
alert.8
In contrast with other possible uses of social sci-
ences, these checklists help to identify dimensions of
risk-related issues that contribute to their social dy-
namic and thus require the contribution of social sci-
ences. They can facilitate the reference to social di-
mensions that aremeaningful for institutional actors
and social scientists alike. The identification of rele-
vant social dimensions can help to delineate what is
at stake when examining a specific topic. Lastly, the
dimensions structuring the checklist refer to meth-
ods, concepts and questions that are state of the art
in the social sciences. By specifying the social dimen-
sions scrutinised in the process of expertise, and by
defining the type of knowledge available to analyse
them, social sciences can be introduced more useful-
ly in risk assessment.
However, designing such a checklist requires a
number of adjustments between social sciences and
the institutional context in which they will be used.
This article relates the experience of the French
Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire (ANSES). In
2011, ANSES supported the conception of a sociolog-
ical checklist on risk assessment and health safety.
This paper will provide the checklist, describing its
conception and presenting its contents. Our aim is
to spur a discussion amongst risk professionals (aca-
demic and non-academic alike) regarding the useful-
ness of such a checklist and how it could be adapted
to other institutional contexts. Our wish is that a
checklist such as the one used by ANSES will lead
the way toward a renewed participation of social sci-
ences to the evaluation of risk issues.
II. Methodology
ANSES was founded in 2010, following the merger
of the French food safety agency (AFSSA) and envi-
ronmental andoccupationalhealthandsafetyagency
(AFSSET). It currently employs approximately 1350
agents, operates 11 research laboratories, and runs 16
experts committees and 14 working groups involv-
ing 800 outside experts. It covers a wide range of is-
sues in human, plant and animal health. Acting un-
der the supervision of five ministries (Health, Envi-
ronment, Agriculture, Labour and Consumer Af-
fairs), its work is organized around questions
(saisinesor referrals in French administrative jargon)
that are addressed byministries, NGOs or its own di-
rection.
Whilst the former AFSSA had not shown a partic-
ular interest in the contribution of social sciences,
save on consumer behaviour, AFSSET had from the
4 Ortwin Renn, Risk governance: coping with uncertainty in a
complex world (London: Earthscan, 2008).
5 Cécile Wendling, this issue.
6 Jeroen van der Sluijs et al., RIVM/MNP guidance for uncertainty
assessment and communication: tool catalogue for uncertainty
assessment (Utrecht/Bilthoven: Copernicus Institute & RIVM,
2004).
7 Daniel Benamouzig, “L’évaluation des aspects sociaux en santé”,
1-2 Revue Française des Affaires Sociales (2010), pp. 187 et sqq.
8 InVS et Risques et Intelligence, Approche du contexte social lors
d’un signalement local en santé et environnement (Paris: InVS,
2011).
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outset mobilized social scientists to help assess refer-
rals on highly controversial issues, namely mobile
telephony. When ANSES was created, this openness
toward social sciences was maintained, since the
agency would have to take on highly sensitive issues
that could potentially endanger its reputation. A spe-
cial social science unit was createdwithin the depart-
ment of communication, stakeholders were closely
associated to the agency operations with the help of
a sociologist, a social scientist was appointed to the
scientific council of ANSES, an earlywarning system
was installed with the help of a team of sociologists,
and a growing number of social scientists joined ex-
pert committees. Yet as suggested above, this did not
alwaysproduce a significant impact.Accordingly, the
social science unit asked the Center for the Sociolo-
gy of Organizations (CSO) to devise a checklist that
agency staff and experts alike could use when assess-
ing risk issues. CSO had organized with AFSSET a
conference on “Governing Uncertainty”, which had
demonstrated the wealth of social science studies
available in the fields of environmental and occupa-
tional health and safety.9 CSO, a joint CNRS-Sciences
Po research unit that employs both sociologists and
political scientists, is specialized in the study of or-
ganizations, publicpolicies,markets andprofessions.
On issues of risk and health, it has produced exten-
sive research over the last 15 years.
The collaboration between ANSES and CSO was
twofold: a comparative study of the use of social sci-
ences by European and North American agencies;10
the production of a checklist. The latter required an
ad hoc and pragmatic approach: ANSES demanded
a tool adapted to its specific needs, i.e. not a generic
instrument, and easy to use by agents with no train-
ing in the social sciences. This implied a close collab-
oration with the agency in order to devise the check-
list.
The elaboration of the list of questions composing
the checklist proceeded in four phases.
1. An initial set of questions, based on the checklist
devised for HAS but adapted to ANSES’ activities
was established. The questions were listed under
six headings – or sociological dimensions: 1) po-
litical and institutional context; 2) socioeconom-
ic context; 3) forms of knowledge; 4) public are-
na; 5) social stratifications and inequalities; 6)
scales of intervention (from local to global). These
dimensions helped circumscribe the social dy-
namics underlying risk issues.
2. After discussionswith agency staff, four domains
were identified to test the questionnaire. The do-
mains were meant to be representative of the dif-
ferent activities of the agency, both in terms of
topics, and units or services. The domains chosen
were: 1) animal health; 2) nanomaterials; 3) nu-
trition; 4) occupational exposure to pesticides. In
each of these, a small number of agents were in-
terviewed. The questionnaire covered both a de-
scription of the unit or service’s activities, the
types of referrals they dealt with, the social actors
they interactedwith (professional groups, private
firms, state services, scientists, etc.) and the prob-
lems they attributed to “social” phenomena (e.g.
public acceptance, role of the media, litigation,
etc.).
3. Workshops by domain were organized with
agency staff and experts. Prior to each workshop,
one or two referral(s) were examined in light of
the six dimensions by the CSO teal. The analysis
was then presented to the workshop participants
and their reactions discussed: did they consider
the analysis of social dimensions inherent to the
risk issue useful, or not? Did they believe such an
analysis addedsomething toboth theunderstand-
ing of the case and the final report, or not? Did
they feel comfortable with forms of knowledge
they were not familiar with, or not? Did they be-
lieve they could answer the questions themselves,
or not?
One idea, implicit in the approach, was that agency
staff and experts already had extensive knowledge
of the social dimensions related to their domain: they
knew the different actors, understood more or less
their stakes and interests in the matter. But they did
not consider this knowledge to be neither relevant
nor useful when assessing the referral; or if they did,
had nomethod tomake this knowledge valid in their
report. Hence, the goal was to suggest that answer-
ing the questions listed in the checklist did not sys-
tematically require a full sociological analysis; in fact,
inmost cases the knowledgewas there and just need-
ed to be recognized and formatted in such a way as
to help staff and experts answer the question ad-
9 AFSSET, Governing uncertainty: the contribution of social sci-
ences to the governance of risks in environmental health, Interna-
tional conference, Paris, 6-7 July 2009.
10 Cécile Wendling, this issue.
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dressed by the ministries or NGOs. In some cases,
though, answering the questions could reveal the
need for additional research, which could be delegat-
ed either to the social science unit or external social
scientists: but this would have to prove to be useful
for the end result, and not just be research for its own
sake. The end result being a report that both answers
the questions listed in the referral and takes into ac-
count the different publics who will use the report.
Indeed, and indicator of success for the reports pro-
duced by ANSES lies in their capacity to address the
concerns of different stakeholders: to achieve this, it
is important that they be identified as early on as pos-
sible.
4. Based on the data collected during the interviews
and the workshop, a final list of questions was es-
tablished. The number of headings remained the
same, but they evolved in order to take into ac-
count lessons learnedduring the secondand third
phases. The six dimensions of the final checklist
are the issues’: 1) institutional context; 2) socioe-
conomic context; 3) social practices and context;
4) problem construction; 5) forms of knowledge;
6) social inequalities. The questions within each
dimension are labelled in such a way as to make
sense to agents with no particular training in the
social sciences.
The questionnaire was supplemented by two oth-
er documents. First, although concise, the question-
naire with its six dimensions and five questions per
dimension could still scare off agency staff and ex-
perts. Accordingly, a list of ten preliminary questions
requiring a simple yes or no answer was introduced
at the beginning of the checklist. The first four ques-
tions relate to the referral in general and its potential
for controversy and reputational risk for ANSES; the
last six refer to the six dimensions of the checklist. A
significant number of yes can lead agency staff to de-
cide to fill in the rest of the questionnaire. But ifmost
questions end up with a no, or if the number of yes
does not seem serious enough to warrant an added
investment, then the checklist can stop there. In any
case, what is important is that this simple exercise
be completed as often as possible when a referral
comes in: if only to evaluate later on if this proved
to be useful or not in answering the initial request.
Second, although the dimensions and their ques-
tions are supposed to be self-explicit, it was neces-
sary to provide a summarized state of the art in the
social sciences in eachof the sixdomains. This served
two purposes. One, to demonstrate the relevance of
social sciences and reveal that behind each dimen-
sion there exists a bulk of research that supports sta-
bilized forms of knowledge; research that can be
fruitfully mobilized by agency staff and experts.
Two, to offer some rough elements of sociological
reasoning, in order to help staff and experts under-
stand the logics underlying the questions without
having received any specific training in the social
sciences.
The next two sections will present the state of the
art and then provide the checklist.
III. State of the art
The entire state of the art will not be presented here
due to lack of space, but its key ideas for each of the
six dimensions will be summarized. The literature
relates to the sociology of organizations, institution-
al theory, economic sociology, social movement the-
ory, science and technology studies, interactionism,
and cultural theory. The aim of the state of the art is
to explore the various social dimensions underlying
risk issues and to supplement risk perception and
communication approaches focusedprimarily on the
public.
Institutional context: the different institutions
concerned with the topic addressed in the referral
will need to be mapped out. This requires an under-
standing of their interests and values, along with the
way they think and act. The difficulty here is that
ANSES is itself a concerned institution: it is not an
actor sitting outside the political context, producing
science in a neutral fashionwith no specific interests
of its own. ANSES is an actor within the political
landscape, with an interest in establishing and de-
fending its credibility and reputation; and this re-
quires some reflexivity on the part of agency staff
and experts. Once the different institutions have
been mapped out, it is necessary to identify the legal
frameworks within which they operate. This gives
an insight on the constraints that the institutions
face. But social sciences have also taught us that in-
stitutions operate along a set of informal rules and
practices.11 These informal rules will produce rou-
11 Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Les règles du jeu. L'action collective et la
régulation sociale (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997).
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tines, which need to be analysed since the identity of
an institution often rests on them. Lastly, each insti-
tution uses its own cognitive maps, ways of under-
standing and making sense of information it re-
ceives.12Hence, understanding the institutional con-
text of a referral implies being able to account for the
way in which the different institutions perceive and
understand the problem, in terms of their interests
andvalues, rules andprocedures, routines andmodes
of interpretation.
Socioeconomic context: alongside official institu-
tions, a range of public, non-governmental or private
actors are also involved in producing, distributing,
marketing, selling, controlling the different products
that comeunder thesupervisionofANSES.Theymay
be private firms, but they can also be professional
groups (veterinarians or physicians, for instance), or
organizations with a surveillance function. As with
institutions, once they have been mapped out it is
important to retrace the legal frameworks within
which they operate, the formal and informal rules
they comply with, their routine procedures and cog-
nitive maps. It is also important to analyse the rela-
tions these different actors have with each other, and
how these contribute (or not) to stabilized systems,
forms of cooperation and networks. Notions of pow-
er will come into play, resulting from the uncertain-
ties that some actors control and that others value.13
Identifying key uncertainties helps to make sense of
the relations between the different actors, determine
those who exercise influence, and identify the sys-
tem within which they operate. One must also take
into consideration the technologies and forms of
knowledge that are being used, as these also deter-
mine the range of choices actors face.14 In some cas-
es, strong path dependency can characterize a given
domain.15 In others, recent innovations can increase
the level of instability.16 Finally, crises and accidents
also reshape a given system of actors, providing new
resources or opportunities, definingnewconstraints,
thus altering the strategies of the different actors.
Many risk objects are a result of these complex rela-
tions between different actors and their respective
strategies.
Social practices and context: the topics that are as-
sessed often refer to individual or group behaviours,
particularly in terms of exposure to a possible dan-
ger (either as a consumer or a producer). Yet describ-
ing, understanding andmaking sense of these behav-
iours implies putting aside normative judgments in
order to see the logic behind behaviours that may
otherwise appear "irrational". Often, agency staff and
experts will rely on general categories – such as age,
gender, social status or profession. Although useful,
this may lead to errors of interpretation, linked to
the belief that all members of a same category be-
have alike. Categories are also a source of invisibili-
ty, as they exclude individuals who may participate
informally in an activity but are not officially ac-
counted for (e.g. illegal farm workers or farmers’
spouses). Finally, the production of measures may
sometimes averageout extremeswithin the samecat-
egory andprovemeaningless.Hence, instead of a cat-
egory, it can be sometimes be important to look for
the existence of a group, with its own identity, val-
ues, set of rules and procedures. A precise under-
standing of a group’s structure and identity can help
to assess the exposure of its members. Groups have
different ways of acknowledging danger and dealing
with it, linked to their structure and interest inmain-
taining their existence.17 Considering the existence
of a group is also important because it may at some
point become a collective actor intent on fighting for
what it values. Aside from groups, analysing prac-
tices also implies understanding the reasons individ-
uals have for behaving the way they do.18 Based on
the idea of limited rationality, it must be assumed
that individuals make rational decisions, based on
theamountof informationavailable, the context they
operate in, and the constraints they face.19 To de-
scribe this rationality entails identifying an actor’s
goals, interests, resources and constraints, the con-
12 Mary Douglas, How institutions think (Syracuse: Syracuse Univer-
sity Press, 1986).
13 Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, Actors and systems: the
politics of collective action (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1980).
14 Giovanni Dosi, “Technological paradigms and technical trajecto-
ries: a suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions
of technical change”, 22-2 Research Policy (1982), pp.147 et sqq.
15 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher
and the politics of retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994).
16 Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An evolutionary theory of
economic change (Cambridge, Ma: Belknap Press, 1982).
17 Mary Douglas, Risk and blame: essays in cultural theory (London:
Routledge, 2002).
18 Raymond Boudon, Raison, bonnes raisons (Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 2003).
19 Herbert C. Simon, Administrative behavior: a study of decision-
making processes in administrative organization (New York:
MacMillan, 1947).
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text he operates in, and his ways of making sense of
the information he receives. These last two elements
are particularly important when assessing risk ob-
jects. Individuals have to cope with informal rules
and constraints if theywant to be accepted in a group
and their behaviour understood by others. Often
times, what can be perceived from the outside as a
deviant behaviour, or an irrational decision, makes
sense once it is positioned within a set of constraints
and expectations. The ways in which individuals
make sense of the information they receive must al-
so be analyzed in terms of the groups they belong to,
since these act as filters, conveying information that
reinforces thegroup’s convictions, beliefs andvalues,
blocking information that runs counter. But apart
from groups, other mechanisms are at play when
evaluating information, such as trust in the emitter,
or the type of information emitted (abstract, neutral,
general, or the opposite). All in all, this dimension
stresses the importanceof analyzing the contexts and
groups that structure individual behaviours, in order
tomake sense of their practiceswhenexposed todan-
gers and hazards.
Problem construction: the trajectory from a given
situation to its definition as a public problem is nei-
ther linear nor simple. Numerous situations that one
could judge unacceptable never qualify as problems
on the public agenda; whereas those that make it do
not share any common properties. Hence, it is not so
much the “why” that matters than the “how”: one
must analyze the process that leads a situation to be-
come an issue. Within this process, factors will help
to understand how a situation became recognized as
a public problem. This implies in the first place iden-
tifying the actors involved in converting a situation
into a social problem, i.e. one that is judged unaccept-
able and calls for a remedy, and then into a public
problem, i.e. one that justifies government interven-
tion. Once the actors and their motives have been
identified, their repertoires must be analyzed: what
arguments do they use to make their case? What re-
sources do they mobilize? In which arenas do they
choose to intervene? Two key questions here are
problem ownership and problem definition. Owning
a problem allows to impose its definition: the nature
of theproblem, its causes and effects,who is account-
able, the solutions that are called for, andwho should
pay.20Defining a problem is never neutral; it is a con-
tended process in which different stakeholders try
to impose their conception. Problem ownership and
definitionmust also be analyzedwithin specific pub-
lic arenas (e.g. media, courts, parliament…), which
have their own codes and procedures, for instance
on how to formulate an argument or attract atten-
tion.21 As public arenas have a limited carrying ca-
pacity, actorsmust struggle to impose their problems
against other issues: once again, no objective charac-
teristic can explain why some problems succeed and
others fail to make it. Instead, one must analyze the
strategies deployed by the problem owners and their
capacity to adapt to the constraints of different are-
nas, in particular to format the problem’s definition
in such a way as to capture the interests of those in
charge of the arena (e.g. journalists, judges and
lawyers, members of parliament…). Another strate-
gy consists in building alliances with other issue
holders; but thiswill imply adapting the problemde-
finition to fit in a wider frame of contention. What
the initial ownerswill lose inprecision, theywill gain
in visibility and leverage. Hence, problem definition
is an ongoing process, which continues well on after
the issue has made it on the agenda as actors and
groups continue to struggle to impose their solu-
tions.
Forms of knowledge: risk assessment rests on the
mobilization of knowledge forms that need to be an-
alyzed against their disciplinary backdrop. Each sci-
entific discipline has its own way of ordering reality,
conducting experiments, producing evidence, vali-
dating its results, defining uncertainty; these must
be accounted for when topics concern several disci-
plines that assess the risks differently. But disciplines
also produce forms of invisibility, ignorance and un-
certainty: it is now widely acknowledged that as
knowledge progresses, so does ignorance.22 The pro-
duction of uncertainty can be unintentional: disci-
plines trace boundaries between the objects they pur-
port to study and those they choose to discard, thus
leaving the latter unknown; or methods to measure
20 Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking,
Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1981).
21 Stephen Hilgartner and Charles Bosk, “The rise and fall of social
problems: a public arenas model”, 94(1) American Journal of
Sociology (1988), pp. 53 et sqq.
22 Scott Frickel and M. Bess Vincent, “Katrina, Contamination, and
the Unintended Organization of Ignorance”, 29 Technology in
Society (2007), pp. 81 et sqq; Robert N. Proctor, “Agnotology: A
Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance
(and Its Study)”, in Robert N. Proctor and Laura Schiebinger (ed.),
Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 1 et sqq.
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exposure can privilege high doses and accidental ex-
posure, thus neglecting low doses over long periods
of time.23 But uncertainty can also be produced in-
tentionally. In the US, an issue can be regulated on-
ly when the risk has been demonstrated and mea-
sured: accordingly, this has triggered a wide range of
strategies by industrial actors to produce uncertain-
ty in order to delay regulation.24 In Europe, uncer-
tainty can also be manufactured, but in this case to
suggest action on the basis of the precautionary prin-
ciple. Here actors will undertake to demonstrate that
too many uncertainties remain around certain tech-
nologies to allow their diffusion, given their poten-
tial catastrophic and irreversible consequences.25 In
other words, the production of uncertainty must be
analysed critically. Finally, the reflection over forms
of knowledge encompasses “lay knowledge”, i.e. var-
ious forms of knowledge produced by non-experts,
using either conventional or non-conventionalmeth-
ods.26 Although these forms of knowledge are often
rejected in expert procedures, on the grounds that
they have not gone through a standard process of val-
idation, they tend to be more and more developed.
Sometimes, these forms are based on the experience
of individuals or groups. Other times, they are pro-
duced by groups who rely on some methods of ob-
servation, such as “popular epidemiology”.27 Expos-
ing and exploring the different knowledge forms can
lead to a better assessment of the controversial na-
ture of risk issues.
Social inequalities: this topic can be addressed in
two ways, either by analyzing vertical inequalities,
in terms of stratification (such as in the case of obe-
sity, life expectancy or the development of certain
pathologies); or horizontally, by identifying specific
groups of the population who are exposed to equal-
ly specific dangers. Although the former may seem
more objective than the latter, both imply a reference
to what is considered to be normal, acceptable or av-
erage. In other words, framing a situation in terms
of inequality rests on a normative argument thatmo-
bilizes theories of social justice. It also requires forms
of knowledge that will help “reveal” social inequali-
ties, such as epidemiology or social geography. And
finally, even if these claims can be heard, they will
not always be acted upon: for instance, in countries
such as France that put emphasis on equality of treat-
ment by the law, revealing inequalities will not sys-
tematically lead to specific measures, since this
would entail treating components of the entire pop-
ulation differently. In addition, while pointing to so-
cial inequalities can serve to politicize a risk object,
such as in the case of environmental justice and
racism,28 stressing social inequalities can also justi-
fy a medicalization of social issues, i.e. a form of de-
politicization.29 In other words, framing in issue in
terms of social inequalities is never neutral; its con-
sequences need to be taken into account.
IV. The checklist
The CSO sociological checklist is not supposed to be
applied systematically to all the referrals ANSES re-
ceives. The preliminary questions, though, should be
applied as often as possible, in order to determine
beforehand if a case requires special attention. These
can be easily answered, and from there the decision
to answer the rest of the questionnaire will require a
judgment of opportunity based on costs (namely
time). Going through the preliminary questions and
the questionnaire is also a learning process: themore
it is undertaken on a regular basis, the more easily
agents will identify rapidly key issues that need to
be looked intomore in depth. Theywill learn towork
with the checklist, adapt it to their own needs, and
integrate on a routine basis forms of questioning that
are inspired by social sciences. This in turn should
make it easier for them to turn, either to the social
science unit or to outside social scientists, for addi-
tional helpwhen answering a question requires time,
special skills or research.
The learning process also results from the fact that
not one agent or expert should fill in the question-
23 Jean-Noel Jouzel, Des toxiques invisibles: sociologie d’une
affaire sanitaire oubliée (Paris: Editions de l’Ehess, 2013).
24 Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of doubt (New York:
Bloomsbury Press, 2010).
25 Olivier Borraz, Les politiques du risque (Paris: Presses de Sciences
Po, 2008).
26 Brian Wynne, “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities
and Public Uptake of Science”, 1(3) Public Understanding of
Science (1992), pp. 281 et sqq.
27 Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to
Toxic Waste-Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts”,
12(3/4) Science, Technology, and Human Values (1987), pp. 76 et
sqq.
28 Stella M. Capek (1993), “The ‘environmental justice’ frame: a
conceptual discussion and an application”, 40-1 Social Problems
(1993), pp. 5 et sqq.
29 Didier Fassin, L’espace politique de la santé (Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, 1996).
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naire on his own. It should be, as often as possible,
a group activity, with staff and experts sharing infor-
mation, and discussing together certain questions.
And it should also be repeated during the entire re-
ferral process: although it will be undertaken at the
outset, coming back to some questions later on can
also prove useful, for instance in assessing the ori-
gins and validity of knowledge claims, the position
of actors, or the behaviour of groups. Ultimately, the
knowledge gathered should be an integral part of the
final report, putting into context the risk assessment
and management recommendations.
V. Conclusion
The CSO sociological checklist devised for ANSES is
destined to promote and facilitate the use of social
sciences in risk assessments. As agencies are con-
fronted with evermore complex, ambiguous and un-
certain issues, traditionalmethods of risk assessment
are seen as limited and unsatisfactory: they fail to
produce adequate results; they are contested in the
face of growing evidence of low dose, long-term ef-
fects of various substances and epigenetic phenom-
ena; and they are perceived as too distanced from re-
al-life situations. In this respect, the checklist enables
to identify possible alternatives in terms of knowl-
edge production, and to provide data on actual situ-
ations of exposure that are closer to the actual use of
many substances.
Agencies such as ANSES must also learn to deal
with issues that will not go away:30 while many ex-
perts may still be convinced that in the end, scien-
tific evidence will contribute to close controversies
over GM crops or nanotechnologies, more and more
policymakers acknowledge that these controversies
will never achieve closure. Hence their goal is to
reach a form of stabilization, in order to avoid the
controversy turning into a political scandal or a per-
petual source of contention. In this respect, the
checklist helps to identify key stakeholders, their in-
terests and values, and tomake sense of their knowl-
edge claims. By integrating them in the process, it is
possible to achieve some form of stabilization: they
will continue to disagree, but their arguments and
evidence will be taken into consideration instead of
being left out.
In turn, this calls for forms of expertise that are
continuous, rather than punctual; and in which the
different participants explore over time the differ-
ent dimensions of complex, ambiguous and uncer-
tain issues as they unfold. The checklist can be use-
ful in organising this long-term process of explo-
ration.
Finally, as more and more groups and individuals
seize situations of exposure to different dangers as
opportunities to state claims, it is important for an
agency such as ANSES to have the tools to analyze
thesephenomenaand theprocedures tomanagesuch
claims.
The checklist also presents some limitations,
which have already been hinted to.
First, its success rests on its appropriation by
agency staff and experts. Initial results show that this
is possible, but not equally acrossANSES. Someunits
are more open than others to such a line of enquiry.
This is the case, unsurprisingly, of those that deal
with complex, ambiguous and uncertain issues: they
perceive in the checklist a way to reduce the uncer-
tainty by integrating additional data, and to avoid a
political scandal by anticipating controversial issues.
Units that operate in domains that are more stan-
dardised and proceduralised see less of a benefit in
introducing elements of information that have no
added-value to their final decision or evaluation. But
even in the case of units and services that see a po-
tential benefit, three other limits can prevent them
from filling in the checklist.
Second, processing the checklist requires time and
resources. This is an obvious disadvantage in any or-
ganisation that works under time pressure. This is
all the more problematic in the current context of
budget cuts, limited human resources, and a tenden-
cy by supervisingministries to inundateANSESwith
multiple requests, for blame-shifting purposes and
to deter the agency from spending too much time on
its own issues in a move towards greater indepen-
dence. As all services work under extreme pressure,
theymust be convinced that the time they invest now
in the checklist can be won back later, for instance in
avoiding a controversy or convincing stakeholders of
the validity of the final report’s recommendations.
This can only be done with a success story, i.e. a case
demonstrating the usefulness of the checklist in im-
proving the quality, relevance and robustness of the
30 Olivier Borraz, “From risk to the government of uncertainty: the
case of mobile telephony”, 14(8) Journal of Risk Research (2011),
pp. 969 et sqq.
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final report, while avoiding media hype, social con-
troversies or political reactions. Such a success story
has yet to be written.
Third, the checklist will often complexify the pro-
cessing of risk assessment. By adding a whole new
set of dimensions, it will reveal the initial problem’s
embeddedness in a complex structure of social, eco-
nomic and political stakes and interests. Knowledge
regarding these will not always be seen as pertinent
by agency staff and experts when they undertake to
answer the referral; and often they will be right. But
in some cases it will be necessary to add new dimen-
sions to the problem’s initial framing, in order to
make sense of elements that will determine the final
report’s reception and impact. Adding these dimen-
sions will set off a chain-reaction: this will require
expertise that is not always available in the agency,
cost time in finding the right experts, and request ef-
forts to integrate the knowledge produced with the
rest of the scientific data. In some cases, social sci-
ence input will be perceived as controversial, as it
points to the behaviour, values and interests of com-
peting actors. In other words, going through the
checklist will inevitably run the risk of adding uncer-
tainties, ambiguities andcomplexities to an issue that
mayalreadyhavea substantial amountof these.Once
again, only by demonstrating that this will ultimate-
ly result in a more robust report can this be seen as
an acceptable risk.
Fourth, the checklist does not easily fit in the
process of risk analysis described by theNRC in 1983.
The bulk of social science research has underpinned
the artificial nature of the boundary between risk as-
sessment and risk management. While the authors
of the 1983 report stressed theneed to articulate these
two moments, European authorities have often opt-
ed for a rigid separation – resting on the belief that
science and society are clearly delineated. Yet most
social scientists agree that such a boundary is a so-
cial construction and moreover does not withstand
a close scrutiny of the behaviour of experts and pol-
icymakers alike. The questionnaire itself was estab-
lished based on the conviction that such a separation
is essentially a myth. And clearly, going through the
checklist will lead to question this distinction, thus
potentially creating uneasiness among some staff
and experts who still believe strongly in the distinct
nature of their work; as opposed to the more politi-
cal nature of the decisions taken by risk managers.
And even when agency staff and experts have come
to accept the ambiguous nature of the distinction be-
tween science and society, they continue to rely up-
on it as a frame of reference for their activity. In oth-
er words, the use of the checklist runs the risk of un-
dermining key features of the risk analysis process.
In conclusion, the pragmatic nature of this check-
listmust be stressed. Far froma generic, one-size-fits-
all tool, derived from sociological theories and des-
tined to assess all types of risks, it is a tool adapted
to ANSES’ needs and destined to answer these with
knowledge available in the social sciences. Its suc-
cess rests ultimately on the firm belief by agency
staff and experts that introducing social sciences in
their risk assessments will significantly improve the
quality and robustness of their advice to policymak-
ers.
Preliminary Questions
Yes No
Is a large population exposed?
Is the issue controversial or does it emerge in a context of social conflict?
Could the situation undergo rapid changes?
Is the reputation of ANSES at stake?
Are there strong disagreements between the institutions concerned with the issue?
Are highly sensitive economic or professional interests at stake?
Is there insufficient knowledge regarding the practices of social groups concerned with the
issue?
Does the issue give rise to strong social movements in the public sphere?
Is the issue characterized by persistent scientific uncertainties?
Is the issue characterized by strong social inequalities?
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Questionnaire
1. Institutional Context
1. Who addressed the referral to ANSES? On what grounds? How have the terms of the referral changed over time? What
do the institutions concerned with the issue expect from ANSES? What is at stake for ANSES?
2. What specific events led to the referral (crisis, accident, scientific publication, press release, new legal framework, court
decision, stakeholder action...)? Does the issue hold any analogy with previous cases?
3. Which institutions are concerned with the referral? Which ministries? public agencies? elected officials?
local governments? international organizations? Does the issue have a specific history within the administration? Has the
issue already been analyzed by foreign counterparts of ANSES?
4. What are the specific interests of each institution? What are their views on the issue? What management options do they
uphold? What relations do these institutions entertain between each other?
5. In what legal framework do these institutions operate (local, national, European, global)?
2. Socioeconomic context
1. Who are the economic and professional actors involved? On what scale do they operate (local, national, international)?
2. What is at stake for these actors as far as the referral is concerned?
3. What type of relations prevails between these economic and professional actors (competition, cooperation, conflict)? How
could these relations best be characterized: sectorial organization, market competition, firm integration, bipartite or
tripartite negotiation …?
4. Are these relations stable or on the contrary rapidly evolving? If they are evolving, are the changes due to technological
innovations, crises, regulatory reform, the emergence of new players?
5. Has the issue ever been analyzed by economists? How are costs, benefits and risks shared and distributed among
actors?
3. Social practices and contexts
1. Who are the social groups concerned with the issue? What is the approximate size of the population exposed?
2. What are the social practices of the groups involved? Are these social practices similar or heterogeneous?
3. What legal, economic, professional or cultural constraints shape these practices?
4. What types of knowledge do social actors base their actions upon?
5. Have these social practices ever been analyzed?
4. Problem construction
1. Beyond the institutional and economic actors identified, what other actors are concerned with the issue (citizen groups,
NGOs, whistleblowers…)? What are their views on the issue?
2. What are their privileged modes of operation (protest, petitions, legal action, media activism, cyberactivism…)?
3. Could these social actors take part in the risk evaluation process in a relevant way? To what end? What would be the
modus operandi of their participation?
4. Are there competing definitions of the issue? Are the causes and consequences of the issue shared? In what
arenas could these aspects be debated (courts, media, parliament, internet…)?
5. Can alliances or conflicts among the different stakeholders be identified? Who are the most influential actors?
5. Forms of knowledge
1. What are the main scientific disciplines and academic communities concerned with the issue? Are their respective
approaches potentially divergent?
2. Have social sciences already contributed to the production of knowledge on the issue (academic literature, conference
proceedings, reports, specialized experts …)?
3. Are some data or forms of knowledge produced by non-academic actors (public reports, professional groups, field
data, citizen groups, activists, non-conventional knowledge …)?
4. Are there serious uncertainties related to the issue? Are there divergent interpretations of these uncertainties? Are
experts or actors actively involved in promoting these uncertainties? Are these uncertainties likely to remain over time?
5. Is the existent knowledge contended?
6. Social Inequalities
1. How are costs, benefits and risks distributed within the population? Can significant differences be observed
according to revenue, status, gender, age or geographical location? Is a characterization of the issue in terms of
social inequalities relevant?
2. What data can be used to characterize these social inequalities?
3. Are there severely exposed or vulnerable populations (in terms of housing, migration, physical sensitiveness,
cultural differences, handicap, loneliness…)?
4. Which of these severely exposed or vulnerable populations are not represented in the public sphere?
5. What would be the effects of government decisions under scrutiny on either the reduction or the increase of
social inequalities?
